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THE 1990-91 SUPREME COURT TERM AND
ANTITRUST: TOWARD GREATER CERTAINTY
STEPHEN CALKINS*
Enthusiasm for bright lines ebbs and flows. There are times when the
fashion is to strive for perfect, fine-tuned outcomes. Then the costs of
uncertainty-both to litigants and to society-assume greater signifi-
cance. Eventually the legal system celebrates the virtues of certainty and
simplicity, until attention shifts to the inevitable errors that oversimplifi-
cation yields.
The rhythm of shifting sentiments regularly plays itself out in antitrust
law. Merger law becomes complex, then simple, and then complex again.
Efforts to streamline the analysis of trade restraints confront rebellion
against the alleged woodenness such approaches yield. Shifts are also
evident in confidence in the jury process. The jury is treasured for a
time; then society seeks to increase certainty or at least predictability by
entrusting decisions to judges.
This last Supreme Court term produced three significant antitrust
opinions that favor the virtues of certainty and predictability. In Palmer
v. BRG of Georgia, Inc.,' the Court issued an old-style opinion relying on
the traditional dichotomy between per se rules and the rule of reason.
In City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,2 the Court, per Justice
Scalia, broadened and clarified the exemptions for state action and for
petitioning government. Two Justices joined Justice Stevens in a dis-
senting opinion that would have entrusted more to juries.
The most interesting antitrust case, however, was Summit Health, Ltd.
v. Pinhas,3 to which this article will devote disproportionate attention in
order to address adequately the opinions and the confusing interstate
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. The author thanks William
Blumenthal, John F. Dolan, James D. Hurwitz, Neil P. Motenko, and Phillip A. Proger for
reviewing drafts; Shelley Boland, Sarah J. Kopicki, and Cynthia Person for providing
research assistance; and John DeQ. Briggs, Richard M. Steuer, and Daniel M. Wall for
supplying copies of briefs. All errors are the author's.
'111 S. Ct. 401 (1990).
2111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991).
3111 S. Ct. 1842 (1991).
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commerce requirement they discuss. Justice Stevens' five-to-four Summit
Health majority opinion is subject to conflicting interpretations, and failed
to resolve the tensions and correct the misunderstandings that underlie
the interstate commerce requirement. Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion,
which was joined by three junior Justices, potentially would have used
the Sherman Act's commerce requirement to give judges greater author-
ity over central antitrust issues. It is not clear that Justice Thomas would
replace Justice Marshall in the Summit Health majority, or that stare decisis
would prevent adoption of Justice Scalia's approach. WereJustice Scalia's
apparent views eventually to prevail, the possible shift of power from
juries to judges could increase certainty or at least predictability. Until
the correct interpretation of Summit Health is resolved and accepted by a
new Court majority, however, the law will likely remain unsettled.
1. PALMER v. BRG OF GEORGIA, INC.:
CONTINUED RELIANCE ON PER SE RULES
4
Restraint of trade analysis has seen particularly fierce competition
between the virtues of certainty and those of precision. Per se rules
represent the triumph of perceived certainty, but this triumph was incom-
plete and short-lived.
In Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., the Court confronted the tension be-
tween its continued adherence to per se rules and its recently-repeated
expressions of reluctance to apply per se rules in new situations. This now-
familiar tension arose when, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. ColumbiaBroadcasting
System, Inc. , the Court rejected the Second Circuit's finding that a blanket
license was per se illegal price-fixing.6 The Court quoted Topco's cautionary
' The lower court opinions in Palmer are discussed in Calkins, The October 1989 Supreme
Court Term and Antitrust: Power, Access, and Legitimacy, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 339 (1990). The
following discussion is based in part on that article.
'441 U.S. 1 (1979).
6 Although the Broadcast Music Court agreed that ASCAP, BMI, and their members had
literally engaged in fixing prices, it said that "easy labels do not always supply ready
answers." 441 U.S. at 8. " 'Price fixing,' " said the Court, is merely "a short-hand way of
describing certain categories of business behavior to which the per se rule has been held
applicable," id. at 9; applicability of the per se rule turns on "whether the [challenged]
practice facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output ... or instead one designed to 'increase economic effi-
ciency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive.' "Id. at 19-20. The Court's
hesitancy about per se rules also was evident two years earlier, in Continental TV., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), where the Court ruled that vertical nonprice
restraints should be judged under the rule of reason.
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language about classifying business relationships as per se illegal,7 and the
Broadcast Music Court took the admonition seriously.
In NCAA and again in Indiana Federation of Dentists the Court relied on
Broadcast Music to apply the rule of reason to what the Court called
"'naked restriction[s] on price or output.' ,,8 In Dentists, the Court wrote
that it had been "slow ... to extend per se analysis to restraints imposed
in the context of business relationships where the economic impact of
certain practices is not immediately obvious."' Some lower courts drew
from Broadcast Music or its progeny the lesson that the prudent course
was to accept any plausible argument for using the rule of reason. "' On
four separate occasions starting in 1980-Palmer is only the most recent-
the Court has reversed a lower court and shown that it remains committed
to per se rules.''
Palmer's facts suggested classic market division. A major, national bar
review firm and a Georgia bar review firm agreed to divide the country,
with the national firm staying out of Georgia and the Georgia firm staying
out of the other forty-nine states. The two firms agreed to share profits
from Georgia. Not surprisingly, prices in Georgia subsequently soared,
and some enterprising law students sued, alleging a per se violation.
2
The trial court granted a defense motion for summary judgment. It
ruled that this arrangement was not per se illegal because (1) it was not
price-fixing, the firms not having established specific prices, and (2) it
' United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972) ("It is only after consider-
able experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se viola-
tions ...."), quoted in Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 9.
' FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986) (quoting NCAA v. Board
of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109-10 (1984)). In Dentists the Court ruled that proof of actual
competitive harm justified condemning even restraints that are not "sufficiently 'naked.'
476 U.S. at 460.
p476 U.S. at 458-59 (citing Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979)).
1o See also Briggs & Calkins, Antitrust 1986-87: Power and Access (Part 1), 32 ANTITRUST
BULL. 275 (1987).
" See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990); Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc.,
446 U.S. 643 (1980). Calkins, 1989 Term, supra note 4, discusses Trial Lawyers and another
example of a lower court's apparently excessive reluctance to apply per se rules, Balnoral
Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1989) (classic movie split
agreement upheld under rule of reason). Each of the preceding cases involved horizontal
restraints. In Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), a five-member
majority adhered to the per se rule against certain tying arrangements, but this rule involves
sufficient factors to resemble the rule of reason.
12 The students "were quite simply mad as hell and didn't want to take it any more,
according to the law professor who worked with them. Coyle, 'Little Guys' Wil Bar/Bri Suit,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 10, 1990, at 3.
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was not market division, the firms not having agreed to split an area
where they previously had been competing but rather having agreed to
remain in separate areas (Georgia and the other forty-nine states). The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed, two to one, relying on the string of recent
Supreme Court cases expressing reluctance to use per se rules. 3
The Supreme Court reversed per curiam without waiting for argu-
ment. 4 Much of the opinion consisted of quotations from two vintage
antitrust cases: Socony15 and Topco. Socony's condemnation of combina-
tions with the purpose and effect of influencing prices' 6 indicated that
the agreement to divide profits (which was followed by a price increase)
should not be upheld summarily. Topco's condemnation of horizontal
market division made the reservation of geographic areas "unlawful on
its face."' 7
" Palmer, 874 F.2d 1417, 1423 (11 th Cir. 1989), amended, 893 F.2d 293 (11 th Cir. 1990)
(quoting, e.g., the language from Dentists quoted supra text at note 9).
The story is somewhat more complicated than the above summary, although the subtleties
were unimportant to the Court's decision. At least until they began negotiating their initial
agreement (the "1980 Agreement"), the two firms had engaged in bitter competition in
Georgia. The national firm claimed but could not prove that before negotiations began it
had decided to abandon Georgia. The 1980 Agreement was challenged by an antitrust suit,
which was settled when the parties agreed (the "1982 Agreement") to delete express
covenants not to compete and to make nonexclusive the Georgia firm's right to use the
national firm's bar review materials. Significantly, however, the license of the national firm's
name remained exclusive and the national firm did not thereafter reenter Georgia. See also
Palmer, Civ. No. C85-4377 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 9, 1987), reprinted in Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, at Appendix C
(hereinafter District Court Opinion].
The parties did not agree even about which agreement was at issue. The plaintiffs focused
on the 1980 Agreement and alleged that the conspiracy had continued. See, e.g., Brief for
the Appellants in the Eleventh Circuit. The defendants focused principally on the 1982
Agreement. See, e.g., Respondents Brief in Opposition [to cert. petition], at 2. The trial
court held that neither agreement was per se illegal. District Court Opinion at 149. The
court of appeals affirmed but was ambiguous about which agreement it was considering.
It then amended its opinion to declare that the 1982 Agreement is not per se illegal. 893
F.2d at 293. The Supreme Court discussed only the 1980 Agreement except in a closing
footnote. That footnote observed that the district court never considered whether the 1982
Agreement ended the conspiracy begun in 1980, so this remained an unsettled factual
issue. 111 S. Ct. at 403 n.7. The Eleventh Circuit subsequently remanded the case for
proceedings consistent with that footnote and the Supreme Court's holding. Palmer, 7
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 69,411 (11 th Cir. Apr. 18, 1991) (per curiam).
" justice Marshall agreed that the court of appeals probably erred, but dissented because
the litigants deserved a hearing. 111 S. Ct. at 403. Justice Souter did not participate.
"5 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
'6 Palmer, 111 S. Ct. at 402 ("We explained that '[u]nder the Sherman Act a combination
formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or
stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.' ")
(quoting from 310 U.S. at 223).
'7 Palmer, 111 S. Ct. at 402-03:
In United States v. Topco Associates, Inc. we held that agreements between competi-
[Vol. 60
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Whether Palmer should be considered an important case depends on
one's view of pre-Palmer law, and on the relative weight one attaches to
the decision's result and to its wording. Prior to Palmer and the previous
term's decision in Superior Court Trial Lawyers, many observers thought
the per se rule pass6.' 8 A favorite journalistic heading was "Towards
a Structured Rule of Reason."'" The Federal Trade Commission had
described per se rules and the rule of reason as "converging,"20 and had
21suggested an elaborate decisional process to be applied in every case.
Palmer provides no support for blending per se rules and the rule of
reason. Instead, the opinion is a simple, old-style application of tile per
se rule. Most advocates of a blended approach would have reached the
tors to allocate territories to minimize competition are illegal:
"One of the classic examples of a per se violation of § I is an agreement
between competitors at the same level of the market structure to allocate
territories in order to minimize competition.. . .This Court has reiterated
time and time again that '[h]orizontal territorial limitations ... are naked
restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition.' Such
limitations are per se violations of the Sherman Act."
(citations omitted).
18 E.g., Muris, The New Rule of Reason, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 859, 859 (1989) ("It is sometimes
said that there are two antitrust rules, per se and that of reason. This view is incorrect;
there is only one form of analysis, the rule of reason.").
'9 E.g., E.T. SULLIVAN & J. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS § 4.08 (1988) ("Trend Towards a Structured Rule of Reason for Price-
Fixing"); see also ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTIRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (SECOND),
SECOND SUPP., at 1-32-33 (1988) ("The Partial Convergence of the Rule of Reason and the
Per Se Rule").
20 Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, Ill F.T.C. 417, 493 (1989):
The parties have engaged in the usual debate over whether to apply the per se rule
or the rule of reason, but as we have recently said . .. , the utilily of that approach
has been called into question by the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements on
horizontal restraints.
BMI, NCAA, and IFD [Dentists], read together, suggest that the per se rule and
the rule of reason are converging.
2' Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, Il l F.T.C. 417, 493-94 (1989), following Massachusetts
Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 604 (1988):
First, we ask whether the restraint is "inherently suspect." In other words, is the
practice the kind that appears likely, absent an efficiency justification, to "restrict
competition and decrease output"? ... If the restraint is not inherently suspect,
then the traditional rule of reason, with attendant issues of market definition and
power, must be employed. But if it is inherently suspect, we must pose a second
question: Is there a plausible efficiency justification for the practice? ... If it is not
plausible, then the restraint can be quickly condemned. But if the efficiency
justification is plausible, further inquiry-a third inquiry-is needed to determine
whether the justification is really valid. If it is, it must be assessed under the full
balancing test of the rule of reason. But if the justification is, on examination, not
valid, then the practice is unreasonable and unlawful under the rule of reason
without further inquiry. ...
1992]
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Court's result, however, by quickly condemning the Palmer restraint for
lack of a plausible efficiency justification.22 Thus, Palmer's holding is
consistent with a blended approach to analyzing restraints of trade, but
Palmer's language fits more comfortably with earlier thinking.
Palmer's heavy reliance on Topco-it quoted it at length and gave it
perhaps greater attention than any other Court opinion 2 -surprised
some observers. Topco had fallen on hard times, being regularly lam-
pooned as the quintessential example of reasoning-by-categorization. 24
Commentators and even courts had come to regard it as significantly
undermined, albeit implicitly, by subsequent decisions.25
It is important not to exaggerate either the apparent death or resurrec-
tion of Topco. Topco has been subjected to two criticisms: for condemning
a restraint irrespective of the parties' market power, and for condemning
as per se illegal a restraint that arguably accompanied an efficiency-
enhancing integration of functions.2 6 The second criticism is more power-
ful, but it leaves untouched Topco's per se condemnation of naked territo-
rial market division."
22 See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
2' A LEXIS search showed that Topco is cited by the majority or dissent in only 28 Supreme
Court cases, and most citations are brief. Except for several opinion's quoting Topco's
eloquent but imprecise analogizing of the antitrust laws to the Magna Carta and the Bill of
Rights, e.g., Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 56 n. 19 (1982), only
one previous majority opinion quotes more than a sentence from Topco. That opinion is
Justice Stevens's 4-3 opinion (joined byJustices Brennan, Marshall, and White) in Maricopa
County, 457 U.S. at 343, 344 n. 16,354,355 n.30, which pays considerable attention to Topco,
quoting it twice and citing it three other times.
2' E.g., Muris, supra note 18, at 859 (adding that since Topco, "the Court has consistently
applied one rule of reason"; see also H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAW 115-16, 131 (1985) (criticizing case).
2' E.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 226, 229 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.); E.T. SULLIVAN & J. HARRISON, supra note 19, at 116-17; Louis,
Restraints Ancillary to Joint Ventures and Licensing Agreements: Do Sealy and Topco Logically
Survive Sylvania and Broadcast Music?, 66 VA. L. REV. 879 (1980); see also General Leaseways,
Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588,593 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) (dictum
noting "tension" between Topco and Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36
(1977)).
26 This distinction is made nicely in E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 208-
11 (3d ed. 1986).
2' Although some courts have been reluctant to apply the per se rule to market division,
see supra notes 10-11, others have not hesitated; see, e.g., United States v. Suntar Roofing,
Inc., 896 F.2d 469, 473 (10th Cir. 1990) (horizontal customer allocation per se illegal,
relying on Topco); cf. ABA ANTIrRUST SECTION, SAMPLE JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL ANTI-
TRUST CASES B-36-B-37 (per se instruction for territorial allocation). Moreover, some courts
that object to applying the per se rule to restraints ancillary to procompetitive integration
apply it where such integration is missing. Compare Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters.,
Inc., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.) (rule of reason where two retailers
agreed not to compete with each other in new facility they jointly arranged to erect and
[Vol. 60
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Palmer probably should be read as relying on Topco's per se treatment of
naked market division. One can conceive ofan argument that the restraints
challenged in Palmer enhanced efficiency, but the defendants did little to
advance such an argument, and the trial court upheld the restraints on
summary judgment without evaluating any such justification. 28 Thus, al-
though the Court in Palmer did not limit Topco to naked horizontal re-
straints, Palmer's facts were consistent with such an interpretation."
Viewing Palmer's holding as applicable only to naked horizontal re-
straints renders it an unremarkable opinion, but it remains an important
reminder that the Court has not abandoned the per se rule approach to
antitrust analysis. As in Superior Court TrialLawyers,3 ° the Court unasham-
edly applied the per se rule-rule of reason dichotomy. The Court contin-
ues to be impressed by the perceived greater certainty of per se rules.3'
use) with Premier Elec. Construction Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358,
370-71 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.) (per se rule in price-fixing case).
28 See Palmer, 874 F.2d at 1435 (ClarkJ., dissenting) ("the record is devoid of any evidence
that the agreement ... was ancillary or that it had some procompetitive, efficiency-creating
potential"). Since the agreements featured a license from the national bar review company
to the Georgia company, conceivably defendants could have argued that any restraints
were ancillary to this licensing arrangement. They chose not to make this argument and
won below on different grounds. The Supreme Court's reversal merely found error in
those grounds, and implicitly assumed that the challenged agreements were not ancillary
to lawful integration. Cf. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14 n.14, Palmer
("different issues would be presented" had the restraints been ancillary to the licensing
agreement).
29 The Solicitor General pointedly advised the Court that Topco's condemnation of market
allocation ancillary to a cooperative endeavor had "no bearing" on the issue before the
Court. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Palmer, at 10 n.9.
One court has already interpreted Palmer narrowly. Chicago Professional Sports Ltd.
Partnership v. NBA, 754 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1991), declined to apply the per se rule
to the NBA's five-game reduction in the number of games teams can broadcast over
television "superstations":
Palmer recently confirmed that per se condemnation of horizontal agreements is
still sometimes appropriate, even after [GTE Sylvania, Broadcast Music, and NCAA].
But in the wake especially of BMI and NCAA, it is clear that Topco and Sealy no
longer stand for the proposition that every horizontal elimination of competition
is automatically illegal, in case they ever did. Some horizontal restraints may still
be branded illegal per se, as Palmer shows, but the NBA's 5-game reduction is not
one of them.
Id. at 1357 (restraint found illegal under rule of reason).
As an additional caution, note that, as explained below in Part 111, Justice Scalia appar-
ently might weaken per se rules by considering actual competitive effects as part of the
commerce requirement inquiry.
30 Calkins, 1989 Term, supra note 4, at 351-52.
31 Justice Scalia has pointed to the per se prohibition of horizontal territorial division as
a model exercise of judicial power. Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHi. L.




1I. CITY OF COLUMBIA v. OMNI OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC.:
STATE ACTION AND NOERR-PENNINGTON
EXEMPTIONS STRENGTHENED
In Omni Outdoor Advertising the Court, per Justice Scalia, 2 increased
certainty by extending and sharply defining the bounds of the exemp-
tions for state action and petitioning government.33 The Court also ad-
dressed the "sham" exception to the protection for petitioning govern-
ment, but in the process it may have lessened analytic clarity. Finally, the
case provided another opportunity for Justices Scalia and Stevens to join
issue on the desirability of deferring to juries.
The case arose when a newcomer threatened Columbia Outdoor Ad-
vertising, Inc.'s (COA's) comfortable role as Columbia, South Carolina's
dominant (ninety-five percent share) billboard firm. Each member of the
City Council was a friend of the family that owned COA, and the mayor
"was a life-long personal friend" of one family member.14 The family
had "occasionally contributed funds and free billboard space" to the
campaigns of the mayor and certain Council members. 5 When Omni
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. began erecting billboards, COA responded in
part by turning to its friends in local government.3 6 The City Council
cooperated by banning all billboard construction without Council ap-
proval and then, when that effort was struck down as unconstitutional,
by passing a strict billboard zoning ordinance that "severely hindered
Omni's ability to compete. 37 Omni sued the city, COA, and one of COA's
owners, alleging a violation of Sherman Act Sections 1 and 2. The parties
litigated the case fully and bitterly.
32 Justice Scalia's opinion was joined by the ChiefJustice and justices Blackmun, O'Con-
nor, Kennedy, and Souter.
33 This article will necessarily assume familiarity of the basic contours of these doctrines.
For a more general overview, see ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS
605-19 (2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988).
34 Omni, 891 F.2d 1127, 1134 (4th Cir. 1989), rev'd, Il1 S. Ct. 1344 (1991); see also 111
S. Ct. at 1347.
35 111 S. Ct. at 1347.
36 It also responded by, among other things, erecting and improving billboards and by
aggressive pricing.
37 111 S. Ct. at 1348. The ordinance required that new billboards be at least 500 feet
away from existing billboards (1,000 feet if on same side of street). Given the number of
COA billboards, the ordinance's effect "was to block Omni from large areas of the city."
891 F.2d at 1136.
31 The following excerpt from Omni's Supreme Court brief is indicative of the tone of
some of the litigation:
Mayor Finlay berated OMNI at meetings and on the radio. He made OMNI take
down a three dimensional eagle sign, calling it an atrocity. The eagle sign said:
"Columbia Your Progress is Soaring."
[Vol. 60
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COA and the city lost at trial, with the jury awarding damages of $1
million against COA.35 The trial court granted a motion forjudgment not-
withstanding the verdict because the conduct was immune state action and
petitioning of government, but the Fourth Circuit reversed. The court
of appeals decided to join those circuits that recognized a co-conspirator
exception to state action immunity. It found the exception applicable here
because the city "conspired solely to further COA's commercial purposes
to the detriment of competition in the billboard industry., 40 Noerr-Pen-
He never complained about COA's sign with a three dimensional life-size model
of a man with his pants down.
Respondent's Brief, at 20.
'9 The city was immune from damages actions, according to the district court. This issue
was not before the Supreme Court. The reported decisions are unclear on the outcome of
the cause of action against a COA owner.
'0 891 F.2d at 1133. The court (2-1) concluded that the jury properly found "that there
was a conspiracy between the City and COA in violation of Sections I and 2 of the Sherman
Act, and therefore that the City, participating in the conspiracy solely for the purposes of
restraint of trade and monopolization, was deprived of the Parker [state action] immunity
to which it would have been entitled except for its involvement in the conspiracy." 891 F.2d
at 1137. The court cited, among other things, a letter to Omni's owner from a member of
the family that owned COA in which the author boasted of his "life long" friendship with
the mayor, and a conversation in which a COA owner tried to discourage Omni by wonder-
ing aloud whether to "talk to my good friend, the Mayor" to get restrictive zoning. Id. at
1135-36.
The jury was instructed as follows:
joint efforts truly intended to influence public officials to take official action do
not violate the antitrust laws, even though the efforts are intended to eliminate
competition, unless ... one or more of the public officials involved was also a
participant in the alleged illegal arrangement or conspiracy.
Let me put it another way. It is perfectly lawful for any and all persons to
petition their government, but they may not do so as a part or as the object of a
conspiracy. Remember, a conspiracy being an agreement between two or more
persons to violate the law, or to accomplish an otherwise lawful result in an
unlawful manner.
I instruct you that a citizen's communication with a public official even if that
official thereby is influenced to favor the constituent is part of the legislative
process and cannot violate the antitrust laws.
This protection of the citizen fails, however, when one or more or the public
officials joins in an illegal agreement or conspiracy with the person seeking the
political action.
So if by the evidence you find that that person involved in this case procured
and brought about the passage of ordinances solely for the purpose of hindering,
delaying or otherwise interfering with the access of the Plaintiff to the marketing
area involved in this case, that is to say, Richland and Lexington Counties, and
thereby conspired, then, of course, their conduct would not be excused under the
antitrust laws.
So once again an entity may engage in a legitimate lobbying committee [sic] to
procure legislative [sic] even if the motive for the lobbying is anticompetitive.
19921
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nington immunity for COA's petitioning of government4' was unavailable,
the court ruled, because the petitioning had been "sham." "COA's pur-
poses were to delay Omni's entry into the market and even to deny it a
meaningful access to the appropriate city administrative and legislative
fora., 4 2 "Meaningful access" was denied, it seems, because the elected
officials were so interested in accommodating COA.
A. STATE ACTION
On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled first that there is no general
conspiracy exception to state action immunity. This ruling resolved a
split in the circuits but is unremarkable." The Court recognized imper-
fections in the political process.14 "Few governmental actions are immune
If you find Defendants conspired together with the intent to foreclose the
Plaintiff from meaningftll access to a legitimate decision making process with
regard to the ordinances in question, then your verdict would be for the Plaintiff
on that issue.
Joint Appendix, Omni, quoted in part, Omni, Il l S. Ct. at 1352 n.5; id. at 1357 n.2 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
,1 Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, certain petitioning of government does not
violate the antitrust laws. For additional background on the doctrine see Calkins, Develop-
meuts in Antitrust and the First Amendment: The Disaggregation of Noerr, 57 ANTITRUST L.J.
327 (1988). For convenience this article will refer to the doctrine as an exemption from the
antitrust laws, although it can be viewed as referring to conduct simply not covered by
those laws. Id. at 331-32.
12 891 F.2d at 1139. The court found it unnecessary to consider whether there is a co-
conspirator exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
-,3Cf. P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, 1990 SUPPLEMENT TO ANTITRUST LAW 212.3b
(reviewing exception's difficulties). The leading lower court cases are reviewed by the
Fourth Circuit, 891 F.2d at 1133-34.
,11 Interestingly, however, the Court did not cite the public choice literature. Some observ-
ers had anticipated an intellectual struggle as the Court sought to reconcile its interest in
federalism with the burgeoning literature discussing public choice theory and "capture" of
lawmakers by special interests. Proponents of theories of public choice and regulatory
capture analyze political actors as rational, profit (or personal utility) maximizing individu-
als, Claims of acting in the public interest are viewed skeptically. (For an introduction to
the literature see Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. 873
(1987); Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of
Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1991); and Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L.
REV. No. 2 (1988).)
The application of "capture" theory in this context is associated most closely with Profes-
sor Wiley, who would preempt anticompetitive state and local regulation where (1) it is
unprotected by a specific exception, (2) it is not responsive to a "substantial market ineffi-
ciency," and (3) "the regulation is the product of capture in the sense that it originated
from the decisive political efforts of producers who stand to profit from its competitive
restraint." Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 743 (1986);
see also Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism: Reply to Professors Page and Spitzer, 61
S. CAL. L. REV. 1327 (1988); Wiley, Revision and Apology in Antitrust Federalism, 96 YALE L.J.
1277 (1987). Professor Minda would have the "sham" exception turn on whether a private
party had a "strategic capture objective." Minda, Interest Groups, Political Freedom, and
Antitrust: A Modern Reassessment of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 HASTINCs L.J. 905,
1013 (1990). Judge Easterbrook shares with Professor Wiley the observation that the
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from the charge that they are 'not in the public interest' or in some sense
'corrupt,' " according to the Court.45 It is "inevitable and desirable that
public officials often agree to do what one or another group of private
citizens urges upon them. 46 The Court viewed political imperfections
less as a reason to scrutinize local legislatures than as a reason not to
probe. Examining legislative motivation would "require the sort of decon-
struction of the governmental process and probing of the official 'intent'
that we have consistently sought to avoid. 47
As if to emphasize the brightness of the line it was drawing, the Court
said that even bribery or other illegal activity would not bar a state-action
defense.48 Because tests turning on illegality would be unrelated to the
purposes motivating the antitrust laws, the Court rejected such tests. The
issue of bribery and other illegal activity was not before the Court, since
the jury instructions and the Fourth Circuit opinion turned on a generic
conspiracy exception.4 9 Nonetheless, the Court reached out to decide it."
Court increasingly assumes that state regulations should be strictly controlled because they
advantage powerful political interests at the expense of consumers. Easterbrook, Antitrust
and the Economics of Federalism, 26J.L. & EcoN. 23, 27 (1983) (advancing a state action test
that would turn on whether monopoly overcharges would be borne entirely by residents
of the political unit imposing the charge).
The introduction of "capture" theory into the state action debate set off a fire storm of
criticism and controversy. See Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the
Political Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486 (1987); Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation:
Parker v. Brown in the Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987 DUKE L.J. 618; Spitzer, Antitrust
Federalism and Rational Choice Political Economy: A Critique of Capture Theory, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1293 (1988). This furor apparently did not influence the Omni Court, which never
entered the debate. None of the leading protagonists was cited in a brief, let alone by the
Court. To the presumable dismay of academics who have devoted so much time to it,
capture theory was universally ignored.
'5 111 S. Ct. at 1352 (referring to standards proffered in Omni's and its amicus' briefs).
.16 Id. at 1351. Justice Stevens sharply disputed the frequency and desirability of such
agreements: "The Court's assumption that an agreement between private parties and public
officials is an "inevitable" precondition for official action ... is simply wrong. Indeed, I am
persuaded that such agreements are the exception rather than the rule, and that they are,
and should be, disfavored." Id. at 1361 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Somewhat inconsistently,
however, he added that "in many circumstances it would seem reasonable to infer ... that
the official action is the product of an agreement intended to elevate particular private
interests over the general good." Id. at 1362.
17 Id. at 1352 (omitted footnote said Court makes this inquiry only rarely, to prevent
discrimination or for other constitutionally required reasons).
4 8 d. at 1353.
'9 See supra note 40.
50 The Court left open one possible exception. A state or its subdivision may not necessar-
ily be immune when it acts as a "commercial participant in a given market" rather than in
a "regulatory capacity." 111 S. Ct. at 1351. This is a difficult issue and, given the percentage
of the national economy that involves the government as a market participant, an important
one. Already one court of appeals has declined to adopt a "market participant" exception,
Paragould Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Paragould, Ark., 930 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991), and
another has cited Omni's discussion only as a "cf." to its conclusion that a transportation
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Justice Stevens (with Justices White and Marshall) agreed that there is
no general conspiracy exception but dissented on other grounds." Justice
Stevens relied in part on leading conspiracy-exception cases to conclude
that the state-action exemption was inapplicable to Columbia's zoning
ordinances. Key to his opinion was a distinction between economic regu-
lation and regulation of health, safety, and general welfare. Columbia's
economic regulation of the billboard market should be immune only
if authorized by a state policy to displace competition with economic
regulation, he argued, and no such policy should be inferred from a
general grant of zoning power.5 2 He concluded that the defendants had
engaged in a conspiracy that was not protected state action.53
The majority would have none of this. Zoning regulations inevitably
lessen competition. When a state legislature authorizes local zoning, it is
clearly articulating a" 'state policy to authorize anticompetitive conduct' "
and thus satisfies the key prerequisite for immunizing that activity. 54 The
Court wrote that the proffered distinction between economic and general
authority's status as a potential competitor engaging in a "proprietary" activity should not
prevent immunity. Allright Colorado, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 937 F.2d 1502,
1510 & n.ll (I0th Cir. 1991).
5 111 S. Ct. at 1363.
1 Municipalities do not automatically enjoy immunity, the Court has ruled; they enjoy
immunity only when acting pursuant to a" 'clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed' "
state policy " 'to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service.' " Town
of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 39 (1985) (quoting Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410, 413 (1978) (plurality opinion of Justice Brennan)). The
court of appeals concluded that this standard was satisfied by South Carolina's authorization
of zoning. 891 F.2d at 1131-32. The issue was not raised on appeal or briefed by the
parties. Nonetheless, Justice Stevens wrote that he "would hold that the city of Columbia's
economic regulation of the billboard market pursuant to a general grant of zoning power
is not exempt from antitrust scrutiny." 111 S. Ct. at 1361.
"Justice Stevens used various phrasings of his standard and of his description of the
defendants' actions. He said thatjuries "are capable of recognizing the differences between
independent municipal action and action taken for the sole purpose of carrying out an
anticompetitive agreement for the private party." I I l S. Ct. at 1362. An accompanying
footnote read the jury instructions quoted above at note 40. as requiring proof that "the
ordinance was enacted for the sole purpose of interfering with access to the market." Id.
at 1362 n.9. That footnote also stated, however, that "the plaintiff must prove that the
municipal action is the product of an anticompetitive agreement with private parties." Id.
Justice Stevens concluded that the Court "errs in extending the state action exemption to
municipalities that enter into private anticompetitive agreements under the guise of acting
pursuant to a general state grant of authority to regulate health, safety, and welfare." Id.
at 1363.
"'111 S. Ct. at 1350 (quoting Town of Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 40 (1985)
(internal quotation omitted)). Also quoting Hallie (at 42), the Court added that it is sufficient
that "suppression of competition is the 'foreseeable result' of what the statute authorizes."
For an interesting contrast compare Lancaster Community Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp.
Dist., 940 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 1991, as refiledJuly 15, 1991), where the Ninth Circuit
amended its opinion, post-Omni, to support its conclusion that a hospital district lacked
immunity because California's policy had been to promote competition.
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welfare regulation is without precedential support and would "defy ratio-
nal implementation. '""
Justice Stevens complained that the majority's approach stemmed from
unreasonable "fear" of "subjecting the motivations and effects of munici-
pal action to antitrust scrutiny. 56 He pointedly noted that problems of
proof here are "substantially the same" as in most antitrust cases. Such
problems should be dealt with, if at all, through heightened evidentiary
standards. Justice Stevens's points were similar to those in his dissent in
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. ,57 again from a majority
opinion authored by Justice Scalia. Justice Stevens's Business Electronics
dissent attracted only Justice White; his dissent in Omni attracted only
Justices White and Marshall. Most Justices seem comfortable with the
greater certainty in antitrust law that at least some of Justice Scalia's
efforts are achieving.
B. PETITIONING GOVERNMENT
The Omni Outdoor Advertising Court also considered two Noerr-Pen-
nington issues. It first ruled that the "sham" exception, the basis of the
Fourth Circuit's decision, was not satisfied. It then addressed the question
whether there is a conspiracy exception to Noerr-an issue not reached
by the Fourth Circuit-and ruled that there is no such exception.
1. "Sham" Exception
As noted above, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the "sham" exception
applied, thus eliminating any protection for COA's petitioning. This was
a misapplication of the Supreme Court's teaching in Allied Tube & Conduit
v. Indian Head, Inc. that the "sham" exception applies to "private action
that is not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action.""
It follows from Allied Tube's analysis that bribery and conspiracy are
normally not subject to the "sham" exception because, if anything, they
" Ill1 S. Ct. at 1350 n.4.
56 Id. at 1361 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"7 485 U.S. 717 (1988). In Business ElectronicsJ ustice Stevens complained that "the majority
exhibits little confidence in the judicial process as a means of ascertaining the truth," and
wrote that "the rule the majority fashions today is based largely on its concern that in other
cases juries will be unable to tell the difference between truthful and pretextual defenses."
Id. at 751-53. "Proof of motivation," according to Justice Stevens, is a "commonplace in
antitrust litigation of which the majority appears apprehensive." Id. at 753. Justice Stevens's
opinions in Omni and Business Electronics are compared nicely in Stoll & Goldfein, "Omni"-
A Bright Line Test, N.Y.LJ., Apr. 16, 1991, at 6.
" 486 U.S. 492, 508 n.4 (1988), quoted in Omni, 891 F.2d at 1138; see also Allied Tube, 486
U.S. at 500 n.10 ("activity that was not genuinely intended to influence governmental
action" is "sham"). In Omni the Court quoted the Allied Tube language noted in the text but
appended the words, "at all," which emphasizes the narrowness of the exception.
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indicate particularly fervent intentions to influence government.59 If ever
in doubt, reversal of the Fourth Circuit's conclusion seemed inevitable
once Chief Justice Rehnquist quipped, during oral argument, that many
legislative hearings would be subject to sanctions if legislators' failure to
listen were actionable. 60
The Court never should have reached the "sham" exception, however.
Allied Tube explained that" 'where a restraint upon trade or monopoliza-
tion is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to private
action,' those urging the governmental action enjoy absolute immunity
from antitrust liability for the anticompetitive restraint."'', Harm by re-
quested, valid governmental action cannot support antitrust liability
against a private petitioner.62 Unless the plaintiff could show that its
damages, which were caused by acts of the City Council, were not the
result of valid governmental action, the defendant should have won. The
"sham" exception is irrelevant. Although the Court's discussion of the
exception was generally correct,63 the Court lessened analytic clarity by
seeming to presume the exception was properly at issue.
2. Conspiracy Exception
Without significant analysis beyond that contained in its rejection of
the state action conspiracy exception, the Court also rejected the much-
debated possible "conspiracy" exception to the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine.64 The Court's entire discussion fills about one-half page. The "same
factors" that were "described above, make it impractical or beyond the
purpose of the antitrust laws ... to identify and invalidate lobbying that
has produced selfishly motivated agreement with public officials." '65 Thus,
even "unlawfulness" such as, presumably, bribery, is protected.
" Calkins, supra note 41, at 338-40 (disagreeing with cases taking a broader view of
exception).
o See Supreme Court Hears Argument on Scope of Parker and Noerr in Ordinance Context, 59
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 812 (Nov. 29, 1990).
6' 486 U.S. 492,499 (1988). Petitioners properly made this argument first, discussing the
"sham" exception only as an alternative grounds for prevailing. Petitioners' Brief at 24-
25.
62 This point is developed in Calkins, supra note 41, at 341-44.
"' The Court correctly reversed the Fourth Circuit and accurately quoted the Allied Tube
standard, see supra note 58. The Court also said, however, that the "sham" exception applies
only to "situations in which persons use the governmental process-as opposed to the outcome
of that process-as an anticompetitive weapon." 111 S. Ct. at 1354 (emphasis in original).
To the extent that this shifts attention away from a petitioner's motivation to the source of
the restraint, it introduces confusion and is not faithful to Allied Tube.
6' For background see Calkins, supra note 41, at 352-54.
l5 111 S. Ct. at 1355. Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion briefly objected. Id. at 1363 ("the
evidence in the record is sufficient to support the jury's finding that a conspiracy existed
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If this broad rejection is law it is a sharp and relatively unexplained
break with language in the Allied Tube opinion issued only three years
ago. There the Court disagreed with the "absolutist position that the Noerr
doctrine immunizes every concerted effort that is genuinely intended to
influence governmental action. 6 6 Instead, Allied Tube said that immunity
depends "on the source, context, and nature of the anticompetitive re-
straint at issue, 67 and that it had "never suggested" that bribery "merits
protection. 68 Many commentators and lower courts have recommended
or recognized some form of a conspiracy exception.69 Lower courts con-
sidering the antitrust immunity of questionable payments generally fol-
lowed a wavering line tying antitrust immunity to the non-antitrust legal-
ity of those payments. 0 Now, in dicta,7' the Court has reversed itself
with respect to bribery and other unlawful petitioning and has broadly
rejected any conspiracy exception.
Such a rejection of any conspiracy exception has implications for the
very foundation of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Some courts and com-
mentators view the doctrine as a First Amendment-based exemption
from the antitrust laws; others insist it is simply an interpretation of those
laws. The former position is weakened by a conclusion that Noerr protects
even bribery from an antitrust challenge, because bribery probably does
not enjoy First Amendment protection. 2
between the private party and the municipal officials in this case so as to remove the private
petitioner's conduct from the scope of Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity").
6 486 U.S. at 503.
67 486 U.S. at 498. This comparison is developed in a forthcoming monograph on the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine by the ABA Antitrust Section.
6 8 Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 504 (7-2); see also id. at 502 n.7 (noting dictum in California
Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972), that "bribery of a
public purchasing agent may violate the antitrust laws").
69 For support for a "thoughtful co-conspirator exception," see Calkins, supra note 41, at
352-54. Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp argued that the conspiracy exception should
be applied where a government official is bribed, makes a decision solely "out of personal
bias," or favors a "personal financial interest" related to that of the private alleged conspira-
tor. P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 43, at 42. Professor Elhauge thinks they go
too far, but he would achieve some of the same results by regarding action by a financially
interested official as private rather than governmental. Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust
Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 667, 706 (1991).
'0 Calkins, supra note 41, at 354-56.
7 The very general "conspiracy exception"jury instructions are quoted above at note 40.
72 Resolving the Noerr-Pennington doctrine's basis has some important ramifications. For
instance, if the doctrine were constitutional it would not apply to petitioning foreign
governments. Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis
and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. Crn. L. REv. 80, 120-21 (1977). The
disagreement about the basis of the Noerr doctrine, the relationship between a possible
bribery exception and this disagreement, and the implications of concluding that the
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The Court's half-page rejection of a possible conspiracy exception
mentioned none of these issues or implications. Although the language
of that discussion is broad, it should be read in context. This was an easy
Noerr case. Requested government action was responsible for all the
harm at issue. Omni could not plausibly claim that COA had so closely
controlled government officials that ostensible government action was
actually private. Charges of corruption were frivolous. Campaign contri-
butions totalled less than $300,13 and the free billboard space donated to
political campaigns was worth no more than $1,500.74 "There was no
evidence of any illegal conduct such as bribery, coercion, violence, kick-
backs, or the like," and no elected official "stood to gain any personal
financial advantage by passing the billboard ordinances. ,75 Under these
circumstances the Court's Noerr outcome was undoubtedly correct. How
far its words should extend beyond the facts of the case is less clear.
Regardless, the bold strokes of Justice Scalia's opinion should increase
certainty by making it easier for judges promptly to dispose of some state
76action and Noerr-Pennington cases .
III. SUMMIT HEALTH: CONFUSION ABOUT
INTERSTATE COMMERCE CONTINUES
Just as in Omni the four junior Justices,joined by the Chief Justice and
Justice Blackmun, facilitated prompt disposition of certain cases, so too
in Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas7' the four juniorJustices would have eased
doctrine is merely one of statutory interpretation are discussed in Calkins, supra note 41,
at 329-32, 356.
"' This is the figure in the petitioners' brief (at 6 n.6); see also Petitioners' Reply Brief at
9 n.12. The respondent's brief did not quantify amounts. Cf. Respondent's Brief at 23
(describing COA support of politicians).
" This concession was elicited from the plaintiff's lawyer by Justice Marshall. Argument,
supra note 60.
" The quotation is from Judge Wilkins's dissenting opinion below, 891 F.2d at 1146; no
subsequent brief or opinion disagreed with his observations. Much of petitioners' brief was
devoted to emphasizing the complete absence of bribes or personal financial interests.
" Cf., e.g., TeleSTAR Inc. v. MCI Communications Corp., Nos. 90-4125 & 90-4128 (10th
Cir. Oct. 9, 1991) (unpublished opinion affirming dismissal of suit challenging non-sham
opposition to issuance of FCC licenses), noted in 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
511; Municipal Utils. Bd. of Albertville v. Alabama Power Co., 934 F.2d 1493 (1 1th Cir.
1991) (withdrawing pre-Omni opinion, ruling for defendants on conspirator-exception
issue and authorization question, but remanding for consideration of active supervision
issue); Allright Colorado, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 937 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir. 1991)
(rules and regulations disadvantaging off-site airport parking firms immune, relying on
Omni to reverse lower court); Buckley Construction, Inc. v. Shawnee Civic & Cultural Dev.
Auth., 933 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1991) (relying on Omni to affirm dismissal of suit by
disappointed bidder); Fisichelli v. Town of Methuen, 764 F. Supp. 2 (D. Mass. 1991)
(summary judgment granted based solely on Omni in suit challenging decision of town
council; court had previously refused to dismiss).
" 111 S. Ct. 1842 (1991).
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dismissal of Sherman Act cases, this time for want of the required effect
on interstate commerce."' In Summit Health, however, the Chief Justice
and Justice Blackmun elected tojoin justice Stevens and the other senior
Justices, so thejuniorJustices could only dissent.] That dissent, by Justice
Scalia, is nonetheless the term's most provocative antitrust opinion."" Had
it attracted another vote, it might have shifted significant power from
juries to judges. Such a shift would tend to increase the certainty or at
least the predictability of antitrust law.
The Sherman Act's interstate commerce requirement is a particularly
confusing fragment of antitrust law. Much of the confusion stems from
tension between the relatively narrow words of the statute and the rela-
tively broad gloss added by Supreme Court dicta. The discussion below
examines this tension and some attempts to resolve it, and then considers
the majority and dissenting opinions in Summit Health. It then reviews
another source of confusion: disagreement as to whether the commerce
requirement is substantive or jurisdictional, in the sense of controlling a
court's power to hear a case (the sense in which this article will use the
term). Summit Health missed an opportunity to clarify this issue. Finally,
this article reflects on the law as it is and as it might be.
A. TENSION BETWEEN TI-IE STATUTE AND THE
SUPREME COURT's GLOSS ON IT
The Sherman Act condemns "[e]very contract, combination . or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
" Since Summit Health was a Sherman Act case, this discussion will he limited to that
antitrust law. Much of the analysis has more general applicability, however, except that
Clayton Act cases must meet a higher interstate commerce threshold. E.g., Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974).
79Justice Stevens's majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and jUstices White,
Marshall, and Blackmun.
'0 In addition to the issues discussed in the text, both opinions in Summit Health are
noteworthy for their attention to Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207
(1959), which is as controversial as the 'opico decision relied on in Palmer. See, e.g., HoVwN-
KAMP, supra note 24, at 277 ("The facts of Klor's are perplexing, and there is some reason
to think the Court would reconsider its decision today."). The Summit Health majoriiy
quoted Klor's' most famorus line as part of its discussion of the application of tlie commerce
requirement to an alleged boycott: "For if a violation of the Sherman Act occurred, the
case is necessarily more significant than the fate of 'just one merchant whose business is so
small that his destruction makes litile difference to the economy.' " Ill S. Ct. at 1848
(quoting Klor's, 359 U.S. at 213, omitting foot note). Justice Scalia's dissent explained boycott
law by relying on Judge Bork's explication of Klo's:
Since group boycotts are per se violations (not hecause they necessarily affect
competition in the relevant market, but because they deprive al least some consulln-
ers of a preferred supplier, see R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 331-332 (1978)),
Dr. Pinhas need not prove an effect on competition in the Los Angeles area to
prevail if the Sherman Act applies.
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or with foreign nations.""' The Court has regularly asserted, however,
that "in enacting § 1 Congress 'wanted to go to the utmost extent of its
Constitutional power in restraining trust and monopoly agreements.
'
..
The statute and the Supreme Court's gloss on it are inconsistent. The
statutory language requires, at a minimum, some connection between a
challenged arrangement and interstate commerce." Congressional
power is more sweeping. Congressional power can be invoked to prevent
a clinic from denying a promotion because of racial discrimination, or
from discriminating against a single patient.8 4 Congress can impose
wheat-growing quotas that prevent a farmer from planting wheat for his
own bread.8 5 Every instance of loan-sharking affects commerce, the
Court has ruled, because Congress has regulated that "class of activi-
ties."8 6 An arsonist torching a single apartment commits a federal offense
because renting is a "class of activities" that Congress has regulated. It
is difficult to imagine anything otherwise violative of the antitrust laws
that could not be reached by Congress, as a matter of Congressional
power. The language about the reach of the Sherman Act, if taken
seriously, would edit the commerce requirement out of that Act.
There once was an uneasy truce between the statute and the Court's
gloss on it. The expansive language was repeated, but Supreme Court
IIl S. Ct. at 1851 (Scalia, J., dissenting; emphasis in original). Justice Scalia went on to
argue that the Sherman Act did not apply. In the process, however, he helped give new
life to an old case.
8' 15 U.S.C. § 1. Sherman Act Section 2 prohibits monopolization of "any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations." Id. § 2. This article
assumes some familiarity with the antitrust laws' interstate commerce requirements. For a
general introduction, see ANTITRUST LAW DEVLOPMENTS, supra note 33, at 24-28.
1 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194 (1974) (quoting United States
v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944)); see also Atlantic Cleaners
& Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 ("Congress meant to deal comprehensively and
effectively with the evils resulting from contracts, combinations and conspiracies in restraint
of trade, and to that end to exercise all the power it possessed."), quoted in part in Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940).
justice Blackmun has observed that saying Congress intended to exercise all the power
it had does not mean that Congress necessarily intended to exercise power it later received,
so one could easily read the Sherman Act as limited to Congressional power as of 1890-
but he added, "that bridge already has been crossed." Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U.S. 579, 606 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
" This article discusses only interstate (not foreign) commerce. The statutory reference
to "trade or commerce among the several States" is regularly shortened in this context to
the words "interstate commerce" or simply "commerce."
"' Cf. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
"5 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
16 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
17 Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858 (1985).
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cases required that a challenged restraint either be in interstate commerce
or (more typically) substantially affect interstate commerce. 8 Lower court
cases were not altogether consistent,89 but differences were manageable.
This changed in 1980. In McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans,90
the Court disrupted the uneasy truce by seeming to take seriously the
language about the reach of the Sherman Act. The Fifth Circuit had
dismissed a class action challenging alleged price-fixing by New Orleans
real estate brokers. 9' Any such wrongdoing, the court of appeals said,
was not in commerce and did not affect commerce. The Supreme Court
could have reversed simply by finding a substantial effect on commerce,
as it had done less than four years earlier in Hospital Building Co. v.
Trustees of Rex Hospital.92 Instead, the Court, per Chief Justice Burger,
wrote a singularly confusing opinion.
Responsibility may lie partly with (now)Judge Easterbrook. Petitioners
in McLain submitted a fact-specific brief arguing that the challenged
restraint affected commerce. In contrast, Judge Easterbrook, then dep-
uty solicitor general, challenged the Court to take seriously its language
about the reach of the Sherman Act.93 The government's brief opened
88 E.g., Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321 (1967) (per curiam); see Mann, The Affecting
Commerce Test: The Aftermath of McLain, 24 HousToN L. REV. 849, 860 (1987). A common
phrasing was used in Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 743
(1976) (Marshall,J.): "As long as the restraint in question 'substantially and adversely affects
interstate commerce,' the interstate commerce nexus required for Sherman Act coverage
is established" (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974), and
citing Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 234
(1948)). The "effect on commerce" test is almost always easier to satisfy than the "in
commerce" test, so litigation (and this article) focus principally on the former.
Although the Rex Hospital phrasing requires "adverse" as well as "substantial" effects, it
is doubtful that the Court intended to make much of this apparently dual requirement.
Rex Hospital itself twice stated that Sherman Act coverage requires only a "substantial effect
on interstate commerce," 425 U.S. 744, 747 n.5. Rex Hospital also explained, "An effect can
be 'substantial' . . . even if its impact on interstate commerce falls far short of causing
enterprises to fold or affecting market price." Id. at 745 (citing United States v. Employing
Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954)). For a good discussion of this point, see Note, The
Interstate Commerce Test forJurisdiction in Sherman Act Cases and Its Substantive Applications, 15
GA. L. REV. 714, 717-19 (1981).
"9 See Georgia Note, supra note 88, at 716 (nexus required between conduct and commerce);
Conflicting Interpretations of the Sherman Act'sJurisdictional Requirement, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1215
(1979) (many lower courts stricter than Supreme Court).
90444 U.S. 232 (1980).
"' 583 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1978).
92 425 US. 738 (1976) (sufficient that effort to block construction of a hospital, if success-
ful, would affect significantly the amount of interstate purchases and payments).
93 Letter from Judge Frank H. Easterbrook to Stephen Calkins (Sept. 9, 1991) (The brief
was written "to see whether the Supreme Court was willing to take seriously its oft-repeated,
but ne'er followed assertion that the Sherman Act exercises Congress' full powers under
the Commerce Clause." If the Sherman Act does exercise that power, that should virtually
end the discussion. "And if the Sherman Act exercises less than the whole national power,
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by discussing the reach of the Sherman Act, reviewed the incredible
breadth of Congressional power, and then described the real estate busi-
ness' effect on interstate commerce. The brief concluded: "Congress thus
has the power, under the Commerce Clause, to regulate the affairs of
real estate brokers. And because the Sherman Act expresses all the power
,,94Congress possesses, it applies to the market in realty services.
The Supreme Court apparently was impressed with this argument.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion noted the breadth of the Commerce
Clause and the "corresponding broad reach of the Sherman Act., 95 The
Court then seemed to adopt the Solicitor General's view that it was
sufficient that the brokerage business be in interstate commerce:
To establish the jurisdictional element of a Sherman Act violation it
would be sufficient for petitioners to demonstrate a substantial effect
on interstate commerce generated by respondents' brokerage activity.
Petitioners need not make the more particularized showing of an effect
I hoped the Court would say so and stop the pretense."). The three titled signatories of the
government's brief in McLain were Solicitor General Wade H. McCree, Jr., Assistant
Attorney GeneralJohn H. Shenefield, and Easterbrook. Easterbrook argued for the govern-
ment. In contrast, the three titled signatories of the government's brief in Rex Hospital and
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), which are discussed in the next
footnote, were Solicitor General Robert H. Bork; Assistant Attorney General Thomas E.
Kauper; and Assistants to the Solicitor General Robert B. Reich (Rex Hospital) and Gerald
P. Norton (Goldfarb). Bork argued for the government in Goldfarb; the government did not
participate in the Rex Hospital argument.
9' Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, text at n. 18. A final section of the brief
quickly argued in the alternative that petitioners should be permitted to show at trial any
required effect on commerce. During oral argument Easterbrook explained that "if the
Sherman Act expresses all of the power Congress has to exercise, and if ... the Sherman
Act does not apply to the activities of brokers at all, it must follow that Congress has no
power over brokers. That seems an extraordinary proposition .. "
The government's brief in McLain differed notably from its briefs a few years earlier in
Goldfarb and Rex Hospital. The Goldfarb brief argued simply that "the restraints challenged
in this case substantially affect interstate commerce." Memorandum for the United States
as Amicus Curiae, Goldfarb, at 32. The Rex Hospital brief is more complicated. One Raleigh,
North Carolina, hospital allegedly conspired to prevent a 49-bed competitor from ex-
panding to 140 beds. The Fourth Circuit ruled for defendants, relying in part on its findings
that the alleged conspiracy would not affect "market price[s]," cause any institution to fail,
or otherwise affect commerce "in the detrimental manner that concerned Congress." 511
F.2d at 684. The government objected, arguing that "the Sherman Act applies if the
restraint affects a significant amount of interstate commerce, regardless of the competitive
impact." Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Rex Hospital, at 7. The brief
argued that the dollar amount of affected commerce, i.e., interstate provision of financing
and purchases of medicine, supplies, and management services, compared favorably with
amounts previously found substantial. One sentence shifted attention away from the chal-
lenged restraint ("Jurisdiction is established if the restraint is imposed upon an activity ...
which involves a substantial amount of interstate commerce." Memorandum at 6.), and the
brief repeated the standard Supreme Court language about the reach of the Sherman Act
and noted briefly the breadth of Congressional power. The brief's focus, however, was on
the challenged restraint's effect on commerce.
9' 444 U.S. at 241.
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on interstate commerce caused by the alleged conspiracy to fix commis-
sion rates, or by those other aspects of respondents' activity that are
alleged to be unlawful.9"
Moreover, the Court's application of this legal standard considered
merely the real estate business in general, and easily concluded that
plaintiffs deserved to be heard at trial.
Had the Court stopped there, the dicta about the reach of the Sherman
Act would have prevailed, and the commerce requirement would have
been stripped of its importance. The Court continued, however, as
follows:
To establish federal jurisdiction in this case, there remains only the
requirement that respondents' activities which allegedly have been infected by
a price-fixing conspiracy be shown "as a matter of practical economics" to
have a not insubstantial effect on the interstate commerce involved....
[T]he broker charges a fee generally calculated as a percentage of the
sale price. Brokerage activities necessarily affect both the frequency
and the terms of residential sales transactions. Ultimately, whatever
stimulates or retards the volume of residential sales, or has an impact
on the purchase price, affects the [interstate] demand for financing and
title insurance.... Where, as here, the services of respondent real estate
brokers are often employed in the relevant market, petitioners at trial
may be able to show that respondents' activities have a not insubstantial
effect on interstate commerce. 7
It is not clear what the Court meant by "infected" activities (in the first
quoted sentence) or by "respondents' activities" (in the last quoted sen-
tence).98 If these references were to the real estate business, the discussion
added nothing to what went before. If the references were to the defen-
dants' alleged illegal conduct, the Court apparently was endorsing a
standard that its opinion had rejected earlier. The latter is more plausi-
ble, 99 but neither interpretation is satisfying.
96 Id. at 232, 242. The Court said this approach was supported by two considerations
from case law, namely, that a per se violation can be based on "purpose" rather than effect,
and that a plaintiff can qualify for injunctive relief without proof of "legally cognizable
damages." Id. at 243.
97 Id. at 246 (emphasis added).
9" The word "infected" does not appear in the McLain briefs or oral argument transcript,
or, to my knowledge, in previous cases. "Where 'infected' came from only Warren Burger
and his clerks know." Letter from Judge Frank H. Easterbrook to Stephen Calkins (Sept.
9, 1991).
9 The opaque "infected activities" language is followed immediately by citations to Rex
Hospital, Goldfarb, and Burke v. Ford, in each instance to a page on which a traditional
formulation can be found: Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. at 745 ("the [Burke v. Ford] market division
... substantially affected interstate commerce because as a matter of practical economics
that division could be expected to reduce significantly the magnitude of purchases made
by the wholesalers from out-of-state distillers") (footnote omitted); Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 784 (1975) ("The necessary connection between the interstate
transactions and the restraint of trade provided by the minimum-fee schedule is present
because, in a practical sense, title examinations are necessary ... to assure a lien on a valid
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After McLain, confusion reigned in the lower courts.'00 Some courts
followed the thrust of the first part of McLain, by seemingly examining
the general business activities of defendants'' or at least those business
activities that had been "infected."'.. Most lower courts, however, contin-
ued to insist on some nexus between challenged practices and interstate
commerce. °3 This division was exploited effectively by petitioners in
Summit Health, who persuaded the Court to hear an appeal based on the
interstate commerce issue.
B. THE MAJORITY OPINION
One of the odd things about Summit Health is that the interstate com-
merce issues played little role in the lower courts. The district court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the antitrust claims in reliance
on the state action defense."14 The Ninth Circuit reversed based on an
intervening Supreme Court state action decision 0 5 and then summarily
addressed several other issues, including, in three paragraphs, interstate
commerce.
The case involved a familiar claim. A single doctor was complaining
about loss of medical staff privileges. '06 Dr. Pinhas was the most produc-
tive eye surgeon at Los Angeles's Midway Hospital but had a disagree-
ment with the medical staff. The medical staff insisted that eye surgeons
title of the borrower."); Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 322 (1967) ("the state-wide wholesalers'
market division inevitably affected interstate commerce"). The ensuing discussion seems
to analyze how changes in brokerage prices would affect the (interstate) demand for
financing and title insurance. In context, "activities" refers more likely to price-fixing
activities than to general brokerage activities.
0 E.g., Motenko, Establishing Interstate Commerce, in DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST
HEALTH CARE LAW 227 (P. Proger, R. Busey & T. Miller eds. 1990) (reviewing cases); A
Case of Judicial Backsliding: Artificial Restraints on the Commerce Power Reach of the Sherman Act,
1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 163 (reviewing cases).
" See, e.g., Shahawy v. Harrison, 778 F.2d 636, 640 (1 lth Cir. 1985); Western Waste
Serv. Sys. v. Universal Waste Control, 616 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir.) (Kennedy, J.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 869 (1980). Respondent's opposition to certiorari was devoted principally to
harmonizing Judge Kennedy's Western Waste opinion with opinions from other circuits.
Ironically, in Summit Health Justice Kennedyjoined the dissenting opinion, which preferred
the standard he rejected in Western Waste.
oz See, e.g., Jurisdiction Under the Sherman Act: A Close Look at the Affects Test, 60 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 603, 610-13 (1985) (reviewing tests).
"o3 E.g., Hayden v. Bracy, 744 F.2d 1338 (8th Cir. 1984); Furlong v. Long Island College
Hosp., 710 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1983). Leading cases include Cordova & Simonpietri Ins.
Agency Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 649 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1981) (Breyer, J.) and
Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
'04 894 F.2d 1024, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 1989).
'05 Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
106 There have been many such cases. See, e.g., Scott, Medical Peer Review, Antitrust, and
the Effect of Statutory Reform, 50 MD. L. REV. 316, 332-37 (1991).
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be assisted by a second surgeon, even after Medicare halted reimburse-
ment for these services. When Dr. Pinhas protested, the medical staff
initiated what he alleged to be unfair peer review proceedings that re-
sulted in suspension of his staff privileges. When Dr. Pinhas sued, the
defendants were in the process of circulating an adverse report about him
that, he alleged, would have prevented him from practicing elsewhere in
California or even beyond.
The Ninth Circuit found that "jurisdiction under the Sherman Act"
had been adequately established because the plaintiffs had to show only
that "the peer review process in general" has a" 'not insubstantial' "effect
on commerce-which, the court said, "can hardly be disputed."10 7 In fact,
however, the complaint made no such allegation but merely alleged that
the plaintiff and the defendants, and one defendant hospital's medical
staff, were engaged in commerce.'
The Supreme Court affirmed for reasons that are not altogether clear.
The Court could have adopted the standard advocated by the govern-
ment in McLain, i.e., a rule that the Sherman Act reaches everything
Congress could reach. Although the Court repeated the usual language
to this effect, it did not seem to regard this as controlling.'0 9 Nor did the
Court rely on or even discuss the leading expansive test, which looks at
the general business activities of the defendants."0 Instead, the Court's
opinion can and likely will be read at least three different ways:
(1) The Court gave special attention to the "congressionally regulated
peer-review process.""'.. After noting that the restraint was accomplished
through peer review, the Court concluded:
We have no doubt concerning the power of Congress to regulate a peer-
review process controlling access to the market for ophthalmological
surgery in Los Angeles. Thus, respondent's claim that members of the
peer-review committee conspired with others to abuse that process...
has a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce to support federaljuris-
diction.' 12
107 894 F.2d at 1031-32 (quoting McLain, 444 U.S. at 246).
08 See First Amended Complaint Allegations 5-8.
'0 111 S. Ct. at 1846 nn. 7, 8, 10; see infra note 114. For the Solicitor General's views in
Summit Health, see infra notes 115 & 117.
1" This test was advocated, as an alternative, by the respondent. Respondent's Brief, at
part IV. Perhaps ironically, it also was advocated by 22 states in an amicus brief. Brief of
Amici Curiae Submitted by the States of California et al., at 4 ("Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause is very broad power, even extending to very small, remote and local
activities that, in the aggregate, have some effect on interstate commerce.") (footnote
omitted).
.. 111 S. Ct. at 1848 & n.12.
112 Id. at 1848-49; see also id. at 1848 ("The restraint was accomplished by an alleged
misuse of a congressionally regulated peer-review process, which respondent [plaintiff]
1992]
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This emphasis on the peer-review process echoes the reasoning of the
Ninth Circuit." 3 Yet although the Court referred to Congress's authority
to regulate peer review programs, it never explained why this authority
makes the Sherman Act applicable." 4 The question is not whether Con-
gress could regulate the peer review process or has regulated it with
some other statute; the question is whether the Sherman Act reaches a
particular exercise of peer review." 5
(2) The dissent read the majority as asking "whether the entire line of
commerce from which Dr. Pinhas has been excluded affects interstate
characterizes as the gateway that controls access to the market for his services.") (omitting
footnote discussing the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986's antitrust immuni-
zation of certain peer-review programs, and noting Dr. Pinhas's claim that the peer-review
process at issue had not satisfied that Act's requirements).
"' The Court quoted all of the Ninth Circuit's analysis. 111 S. Ct. at 1846 (quoting
894 F.2d at 1032). That analysis is discussed above, text at notes 107-08. Respondent
characterized the Ninth Circuit as having applied a McLain-based "infected activities test,"
and devoted most of his brief to defending it. Respondent's Brief, parts II & Ii.
114 If the Court referred to Congressional power over peer review merely to demonstrate
that Congress could reach the challenged activity, it was over-proving the obvious, given the
reach of Congressional power. See supra text at notes 84-87. The quoted language, with its
"thus," might seem to be taking seriously the language about the Sherman Act extending
as far as Congressional power, but if this were the basis of the Court's decision most of its
analysis would have been unnecessary.
"' Conceivably the Court considered peer review a special "class of activities" that Con-
gress chose to regulate. The Solicitor General argued in the alternative for a "class of
activities" test asking whether "the provision of ophthalmological services" affects com-
merce. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Summit Health,
at 11-18. He surveyed the classic commerce clause cases, and concluded that "once a class
of economic activities is found to affect commerce, Congress can regulate all of the activities
of that class." Id. at 12. Petitioners properly responded that the "class of activities" cases
generally involve review of explicit Congressional regulation of seemingly local activities
(such as loan-sharking and apartment-renting), whereas in Sherman Act cases the question
is whether the statute in fact applies. Petitioners' Reply Brief, at part I1; see, e.g., United
States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 59 n. 16 (7th Cir.) (Stevens, J.) (language of statute similar
to Sherman Act prevents reliance on "class of activities" cases), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837
(1975). If the question were whether Congress could regulate peer review it would be
significant that Congress had done so without objection, but no one doubts that Congress
has this power. The existence of a 1986 statute regulating peer review says little about
whether an 1890 statute should be interpreted as applying to particular exercises of peer
review. Professor Havighurst has argued that the anticompetitive potential of staff-privi-
leges casesjustifies a permissive interstate commerce inquiry, Havighurst, Doctors and Hospi-
tals: An Antitrust Perspective on Traditional Relationships, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1071, 1142-44; see
also Brief of Richard A. Bolt, M.D., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent (by Professor
Havighurst), but although the Court reached Havighurst's recommended result, it did not
subscribe to his reasoning.
Nonetheless, at least one lower court seems to have read Summit Health as holding that
the commerce requirement is satisfied by virtually every denial of staff privileges. In Brown
v. Our Lady of Lourdes Medical Center, 767 F. Supp. 618, 626-27 (D.N.J. 1991), the court
refused to rely on interstate commerce grounds to dismiss or grant summary judgment on
a complaint when a hospital refused staff privileges to a surgeon who had practiced almost
no medicine in a decade. The court said Summit Health required it to presume that such a
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commerce,"" 6 thus adopting the test advocated in the alternative by the
Solicitor General." 7 Parts of the Court's opinion lend support to such an
interpretation. "The competitive significance of respondent's exclusion
from the market must be measured, not just by a particularized evalua-
tion of his own practice, but by a general evaluation of the impact of the
restraint on other participants and potential participants in the market
from which he has been excluded.""" The Court viewed Dr. Pinhas as
having been excluded from the market for ophthalmological surgery in
Los Angeles, and its recitation of factual allegations mentioned commerce
only by saying that the parties were engaged in commerce and that there
was a connection between this "market" (or part thereof) and interstate
commerce." 9 Such a connection satisfies the commerce requirement, by
itself, only under a line of commerce test.
120
(3) The Court's opinion also can be read, however, as adopting a test
turning on the restraint's effect or threatened effect on commerce. The
Court's analysis of the interstate commerce issue is almost entirely a
refusal would have an effect on the entire hospital staff and thus on interstate commerce.
(Summary judgment was granted based on other grounds.)
"ll 111 S. Ct. at 1850 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) ("To determine Sherman
Act jurisdiction it [the majority] looks neither to the effect on commerce of the restraint, nor
to the effect on commerce of the defendants' infected activity, but rather, it seems, to the
effect on commerce of the activity from which the plaintiff has been excluded.").
.. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Summit Health,
at 6-16. The Solicitor General supported a "line of business" test as an alternative to the
"class of activities" test discussed in note 115, and identified the relevant line of business as
"hospital ophthalmological services in general or those of this hospital." Id. at 17 n.9. The
Solicitor General relied on McLain's consideration of the real estate brokerage business and
on then-Judge Kennedy's Western Waste opinion, which focused on the rubbish collection
business. The Solicitor General thus regarded Western Waste as adopting a test narrower
than the "general business activities" test with which it is often associated.
i8 III S. Ct. at 1848.
"'9 111 S. Ct. at 1846 ("The provision of ophthalmological services affects interstate
commerce because both physicians and hospitals serve nonresident patients and receive
reimbursement through Medicare payments."); id. at 1847 ("It seems clear ... that these
[ophthalmological] services [apparently at Midway] are regularly performed for out-of-
state patients and generate revenues from out-of-state sources ... ").
Justice Scalia protested that the complaint included no such allegations, Ill S. Ct. at 1853
(Scalia,J., dissenting), and he is correct. The Solicitor General argued that ophthalmological
services at Midway Hospital affected commerce, but relied principally on the defendants'
Ninth Circuit brief, in which they "appear to have acknowledged" that this business "receives
out-of-state patients, as well as out-of-state revenues." Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, at 18.
"' For an opinion that appears to have interpreted Summit Health as having adopted a
line of commerce test, see Loiterman v. Antani, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8530 (N.D. 1I1.
June 25, 1991) (denying summary judgment). See also Flexner, Going Nowhere in Interstate
Commerce, Legal Times, June 17, 1991, at 38 (controlling factor in Summit Health was "nexus
between interstate commerce and the 'market' in which the restraint was alleged to occur").
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response to the argument "that respondent's complaint is insufficient
because there is no factual nexus between the restraint on this one sur-
geon's practice and interstate commerce." 2' Had the Court meant to
adopt a line of commerce test or any of the other broad tests, the response
would have been straightforward: the absence of nexus between the
restraint and commerce is irrelevant. Instead of making such a response,
however, the Court sought to show some potential connection between
the restraint and commerce. 2
To show such a connection the Court asserted, albeit without much
assistance from Dr. Pinhas's lawyers, that a successful conspiracy would
reduce the provision of ophthalmological services in the Los Angeles
market. 23 If a physician is terminated for resisting what is in effect
medical featherbeddig, 24 a successful conspiracy causing that termina-
tion probably would reduce provision of medical services by increasing
cost. Anything that increases cost affects demand, as McLain observed.
2 5
Summit Health relied on that observation. 126 Thus, when the Court wrote
that application of the Sherman Act turns on an "evaluation of the impact
121 111 S. Ct. at 1847.
122 Relying upon the McLain analysis discussed infra at note 165, the Court explained
that the nature of antitrust law compels examining potential rather than actual conse-
quences. Ill S. Ct. at 1847-48.
23 Id. at 1848 ("if the conspiracy alleged in the complaint is successful, 'as a matter of
practical economics' there will be a reduction in the provision of ophthalmological services
in the Los Angeles market") (quoting McLain, 444 U.S. at 246, which was quoting Rex
Hospital, 425 U.S. at 745). The complaint alleged merely "a conspiracy to effectuate a
boycott and drive Dr. Pinhas out of business in order to capture for themselves a greater
share of eye care and ophthalmic surgery in Los Angeles." Respondent's Brief at "Statement
of the Case."
124 111 S. Ct. at 1848 (Dr. Pinhas alleged a "restraint on the practice of ophthalmological
services" and that he had been terminated "because petitioners insisted upon adhering to
an unnecessary costly procedure.").
121 McLain, 444 U.S. at 246; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, McLain,
text at note 20 ("No economic theory predicts that an increase in cost leaves the quantity
supplied unaffected.") (citation omitted). During the McClain oral argument, then-Assistant
to the Solicitor General Easterbrook carefully traced the causal chain that starts with an
increase in prices.
126 Summit Health, 111 S. Ct. at 1848 (quoting the reference to "practical economics").
Summit Health's summary of McLain is indicative of its concern with the effect of the
competitive restraint being challenged: "We have based jurisdiction on a general conclusion
that the defendants' agreement. . 'necessarily affect[ed]' the volume of residential sales and
therefore the demand for financing and title insurance." 111 S. Ct. at 1848 (emphasis
added, brackets by Court, quoting McLain, 444 U.S. at 246). McLain in fact had required
that "[b]rokerage activities necessarily affect" the volume of sales. By interpreting "activities"
to mean the allegedly illegal agreement, Summit Health sided with those who read McLain
as requiring a connection between a restraint and commerce. See supra note 99. Confidence
in this view of Summit Health is weakened only slightly by the opinion's also having quoted




of the restraint on other participants and potential participants in the
market from which he has been excluded," 127 it was contemplating an
increase in cost and a reduction of output. None of this analysis would
have been necessary had the Court intended to adopt an "affected activi-
ties" or a "line of commerce" test. Accordingly, Summit Health should be
read as requiring attention to the effect or potential effect on commerce
of challenged restraints. The opinion probably would have been read
that way and considered unexceptional if Justice Scalia had not taken
issue with it so strenuously.
C. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT
Justice Scalia's dissent reviewed in detail the complaint's omissions,"'
but that is not the heart of his opinion. Instead, he wrote a scathing
history of commerce-requirement antitrust cases. Until McLain, he said,
"the question was whether the restraint at issue, if successful, would
have a substantial effect on interstate commercial activity. I29 Without
mentioning the dicta about the Sherman Act's reach, he said the question
"is not whether Congress could reach the activity before us here if it
wanted to, but whether it has doneso via the Sherman Act."'"3 He lamented
a missed opportunity to revert back to pre-McLain law.'
3
'
Yet Justice Scalia's approach could do far more than merely remove
McLain. He views pre-McLain law as somewhat clearer than it was, and
presumably would adopt this clearer view, unsullied by talk about the
Sherman Act's reach. Beyond that, however, he apparently would inject
competition analysis into every decision about the scope of the Sherman
Act. The Sherman Act does not apply, he said, unless a restraint either
interrupts the flow of interstate commerce or "substantially affects inter-
state commerce by restricting competition."
32
127 I11 S. Ct. at 1848 (emphasis added).
12 Id. at 1853 ("It literally alleges nothing more than that Dr. Pinhas, the defendant
physicians, Midway Hospital, and Summit Health, Ltd., are 'engaged in interstate
commerce.' ").
29 Id. at 1849 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's discussion focused on the more
common "affecting commerce" standard, and left unchanged the analysis of restraints that
are "in commerce." Id. at 1849, 1851.
"0 Id. at 1849.
3' Id. at 1850 ("Today the Court could have cleared up the confusion created by McLain,
refocused the inquiry along the lines marked out by our previous cases (and still adhered
to by most circuits), and reversed the judgment below."). As shown above, the Court's
opinion can be read to require a nexus between a challenged restraint and interstate
commerce, although such a reading is made more difficult by the dissent's criticism of the
Court for failing to impose such a requirement.
132 Id. at 1851 (emphasis added) ("the question before us today... must be answered by
determining whether, in its practical economic consequences, the boycott substantially
affects interstate commerce by restricting competition or, as in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
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The possible consequences of such a requirement are suggested by
part II of his dissent. Here he read the complaint as alleging price-fixing
for some eye surgery at Midway Hospital"' and concluded that the
complaint should be dismissed nonetheless. Price-fixing at Midway would
not affect "competition" in the huge Los Angeles market (the market
identified by the majority), and any "allegations to the contrary ... would
have to be dismissed as inconsistent with simple economics."'14 The lack
of competitive harm meant that the Sherman Act's commerce require-
ment was not satisfied.
Adopting such an approach would be a potentially stunning change.
In Rex Hospital, for instance, the Court said that the requisite effect on
commerce can be shown even when an impact "falls far short of ...
affecting market price."'35 Justice Scalia apparently would disagree. The
Summit Health majority took it as given that elimination of Midway Hospi-
tal or its ophthalmological department would affect commerce. 136 Justice
Scalia might disagree. If a medical department is too small to "restrict
competition" by price-fixing, its complete elimination might not "restrict
competition." Justice Scalia might routinely require merger-type analyses
in "affecting commerce" cases, which would undercut sharply the power
of per se rules.'37 The full impact of his approach would depend in
part, however, on whether the commerce requirement is substantive or
jurisdictional.
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959), interrupts theflow of interstate commerce") (emphasis
in original; parallel citations omitted).
133Justice Scalia explained that Dr. Pinhas could be seen as having been terminated
pursuant to a conspiracy to engage in price-fixing throtgh "featherbedding." For the
Sherman Act to apply to a termination pursuant to a conspiracy, "what counts is the impact
of that entire price-fixing conspiracy." Ill S. Ct. at 1852 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-
Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 757-58 (1984)). This reading of the complaint is similar to
that worked out by the majority, see supra text at notes 123-27.
13 111 S. Ct. at 1853 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 593-95 (1986)).
1' 425 U.S. at 745; cf. note 94, supra (Solicitor General's Rex Hospital brief argued against
requirement of competitive effect). Unsurprisingly, the Summit Health petitioners did not
advocate justice Scalia's approach. They argued that the Ninth Circuit erred by not requir-
ing a nexus between a challenged activity and interstate commerce. Brief for the Petitioners,
at 2-3 ("The First Amended Complaint does not contain any allegations that the challenged
conduct occurred in or had any impact on interstate commerce.").
6 11 I S. Ct. at 1847.
"' I am indebted to James D. Hurwitz for the observation that requiring proof of
competitive effect before applying per se rules would follow the example of tying law,
where courts engage almost in a rule of reason analysis before applying a per se rule. See
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
The dissenting opinion can be read more narrowly, however. It notes, accurately, that
the complaint is devoid of allegations connecting any restraint and interstate commerce.
111 S. Ct. at 1853 ("there is no allegation that any out-of-state patients call upon the hospital
for eye surgery (or anything else)-let alone a sufficient number that overcharging them
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D. THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE REQUIREMENT'S
MISCHARACTERIZATION AS JURISDICTIONAL**
Defendants use two quite different motions to question whether the
Sherman Act's commerce requirement is met. A Rule 12(b)(1) motion
challenges the court's subject matter jurisdiction. 3 " This puts at issue the
court's judicial power to decide the case-something so important the
issue may be raised at any time by a party or by the court itself. Once the
issue is raised, the burden of establishingjurisdiction is on the plaintiff. 39
If the relevant facts are disputed, the court need not accept the facts as
alleged, but may receive evidence and make factual determinations. 4 '
The plaintiff's burden is met in federal question cases merely by showing
that a claim is "not frivolous."1"' The Supreme Court made clear in Bell
v. Hood'4 2 that jurisdiction "is not defeated ... by the possibility that the
averments might fail to state a cause of action."
Defendants also raise interstate commerce issues by filing Rule 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, less typically, Rule 56
motions for summary judgment. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be filed
before any responsive pleading and should not be accompanied by evi-
dence, since the court must accept the truth of all well-pleaded facts. The
burden of proof is on the defendant, and the motion should be denied
"unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief," according
would create a 'substantial' effect on commerce") (emphasis in original). ConceivablyJustice
Scalia was merely objecting to inadequate pleading. Still, it is unusual to read a complaint
charitably enough to find allegations of price-fixing by a hospital surgery department, but
not charitably enough to find an alleged effect on interstate commerce.
** The author benefited from discussing this issue with Robert H. Abrams, Thomas C.
Arthur, and Edward H. Cooper, but retains responsibility for all errors.
'3' Rule 12(b)(1) authorizes a motion to dismiss for "lack ofjurisdiction over the subject
matter."
139 For simplicity I will call the person asserting a claim the "plaintiff."
40 2A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 12-47-12-48 (1985). Consideration of such evidence
does not convert the motion into one for summaryjudgment; a court may dismiss for want
ofjurisdiction by resolving a factual dispute that would prevent summary judgment. Id.
"' 5A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1350 & text at n.49
(1990); see also 2A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 140, § 12.07[2.-I], at 12-52 ("A
federal claim should be dismissed for lack of subject matterjurisdiction only if the federal
claim is clearly frivolous or wholly insubstantial."). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is not on
the merits and has no resjudicata effect. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE at 225; MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE at 12-45.
'42 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). For other discussions of the difference between decisions
on the merits and dismissals for want of jurisdiction, see, e.g., Montana-Dakota Utils. Co.
v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 249 (1951) (Jackson, J.), and General I nvest.
Co. v. New York Cent. R.R., 271 U.S. 228 (1926) (error to dismiss antitrust case for want
ofjurisdiction where dismissal appeared to turn on the merits).
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to the leading case, Conley v. Gibson.4 ' A court wishing to consider evi-
dence may convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary
judgment; a court may grant summary judgment if the record shows
"that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."'' 44 Antitrust courts
increasingly have been willing to consider granting summary judgment
or dismissing cases for failure to state a claim. 45 Summary judgment or
dismissal for failure to state a claim is a decision on the merits and has
res judicata effect.146
Determining whether a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction to
resolve an antitrust dispute, i.e., ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, ought
to be easy. Federal district courts have original subject matterjurisdiction
"of all civil actions arising under" federal laws. 47 Few antitrust complaints
are so frivolous as to not "arise under" the antitrust laws, so dismissals
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be rare. Lack of a required
effect on interstate commerce normally should be challenged by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion or a motion for summary judgment.
Many courts conclude nonetheless that there is a significant interstate-
commerce-related limitation, i.e., beyond determining whether a com-
plaint is frivolous, on whether courts have jurisdiction to decide Sherman
Act cases. 148 This misapprehension stems from the multiple roles played
by commerce requirements. The Constitution's commerce clause limits
Congressional power, i.e., what Congress could prohibit. The Sherman
Act sought to rely on the commerce clause's authority by outlawing
agreements "in restraint of trade or commerce," so this statutory lan-
guage limits what Congress did prohibit (which is probably not the same
thing as what it could prohibit today). Neither of these concerns limits
the power of federal courts to hear cases initiated by nonfrivolous com-
plaints, but it has become so common to regard the commerce require-
143 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
' FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
145 E.g., Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating
Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065 (1986).
"' MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 140, at 12-63.
147 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Until 1980 Section 1331 had a $10,000 threshold, so greater use
was made of 28 U.S.C. § 1337, which confers jurisdiction of actions "arising under any Act
of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and
monopolies" regardless of the amount in controversy.
14" E.g., Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 487 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1973) (error to submitjurisdic-
tional issue to jury); Rosemound Sand & Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand & Gravel Co., 469
F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1972); see also Save Our Cemeteries, Inc. v. Archdiocese of New Orleans,
Inc., 568 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1978).
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ment as jurisdictional that even Judge Becker, who analyzed the issue
with elegant precision, felt compelled to follow this approach. '"
The problem stems in part from the word "jurisdiction." It should be
used, in this context at least, only to refer to a court's power to decide a
case. Some courts use the term correctly and rule that interstate com-
merce issues normally should be decided on the merits, such as at trial
or in response to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.' "1 Most cases-including, unfor-
tunately, most Supreme Court cases-use the word 'jurisdiction" impre-
cisely. Some discuss what they term "jurisdiction," but do so in response
to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, or using a standard of review appropriate for
such a motion, so they appear to be referring to the reach of the Sherman
Act. 151 Others discuss "jurisdiction" but blur the distinction between judi-
cial power and the substantive reach or scope of the Sherman Act, or use
the term in a context that does not reveal the meaning ascribed to it.
52
Finally, some courts clearly err, seemingly using the term accurately and
yet treating interstate commerce issues as normally jurisdictional."'5
The Summit Health Court treated the interstate commerce requirement
ambiguously. Justice Scalia's dissent referred casually to the interstate
"" Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. SuIpp. 1161, 1171 n.21 (E.D.
Pa. 1980).Judge Becker's discussion is highlighted by Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp.
P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 43, at 258. Another nice discussion of the correct
analysis is Shernan Act "Jurisdiction" in Hospital Staff Exclusion Cases, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 121
(1983). The confusion among the various circuits is reviewed in Mortensen v. First Federal
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 890-98 (3d Cir. 1977) (using Rule 12(b)(6) reasoning to
reverse dismissal of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion).
i5('Good discussions are in Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Board of Reahors,
850 F.2d 803, 811-12 (1st Cir. 1988) (Coffin, J.), which said it was not error to have the
jury decide the interstate commerce issue, and in George C. Frey Ready-Mixed Concrete,
Inc. v. Pine Hill Concrete Mix Corp., 554 F.2d 551, 554 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977) (Oakes, J.), anl
W.W. Minis v. Kemp, 516 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
151 For instance, ChiefJustice Burger's opinion in McLain referred repeatedly to 'Jurisdic-
tion" and said that plaintiffs must "demonstrate" the truth of any controverted allegations,
but the Court read the pleadings "most favorably to petitioners" and relied on the Conlev
v. Gibson Rule 12(b)(6) standard to reverse the granting of a Rule 12(b)(I) motion-wit hout
explaining the proper use of each motion. 444 U.S. at 242, 245-46. McLain would have
been a good vehicle for clarifying the issue because the Fifth Circuit had said (wrongly) the
issue is jurisdictional, 583 F.2d 1315, 1325 (5th Cir. 1978), but neither petitioners nor the
Solicitor General objected.
'52 A good example is Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 742 n.l (1976). The defendant filed
motions under both Rules, and the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, explained that the
interstate commerce isste normally should be challenged as a failure to state a claim. 5 11
F.2d 678, 680-81 (4th Cir. 1975) (Craven, J.). The Supreme Court casually stated that it
would treat the dismissal as had the Fourth Circuit, but that this did not affect its analysis.
Earlier, in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 203 n. 19 (1974), the Cotirt
"assumed" that the commerce reqtirements of the Clayton Act are jurisdictional raithe,
than substantive, but said the legal issues are identical.justice Douglas, dissenting, explained
some of the differences. Id. at 212-14 nn.9 & 10.
15"' E.g., cases cited supra at note 148.
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commerce issue as 'jurisdictional,""" but the context does not reveal
whether the reference was to judicial power. The majority also referred
casually-twice-to 'jurisdiction."'155 The issue had been presented by a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, however, and the majority seemed to treat it as such
by assuming "the truth of the material facts as alleged in the complaint." 5 '
Thus, Summit Health can be read as regarding the issue as substantive.
E. COMMENT
Interstate commerce issues normally should be considered issues of
substantive law, challengeable by Rule 12(b)(6) motions or motions for
summary judgment, rather than issues of jurisdiction, challengeable by
Rule 12(b)(1) motions. This is only partly for reasons of clarity and
accuracy. As indicated above, there are important differences between
Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)-differences in the obligation to accept well-
pleaded facts, in the legal standard to be applied, and in the placement
of the burden of proof. 17 Plaintiffs enjoy some significant advantages
when resisting 12(b)(6) motions that are lacking when challenged by a
Rule 12(b)(1) motion.15" Differences in outcomes may not be as great as
differences in phrasings might suggest, but judges tend to approach
decisions aboutjudicial power differently than decisions about the merits.
Judges must determine judicial authority, even if the question is close;
on occasion they should defer to juries to decide merits issues.
At one time courts may have been tempted to treat interstate commerce
issues as jurisdictional, because prompt disposition of weak cases on
1,11Ill S. Ct. at 1849 & 1854.
""Id. at 1845, 1849.
Id. at 1845; Summit Health, 894 F.2d at 1028.
,7 Differences are reviewed in Seglin v. Esau, 769 F.2d 1274, 1278-79 (7th Cir. 1985)
(facts made it unnecessary to choose between Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)); Mortensen v.
First Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 890-92 (3d Cir. 1977); Georgia Note, supra
note 88, at 732-33 (calling for application of a broad McLain-based general business
activities test only for Rule 12(b)(l) motions); Expanding Federal Antitrust Jurisdiction: A
Close Look at McLain v. Real Estate Board, Inc., 19 HousTON L. REv. 143, 168-72 (1981)
[hereinafter Expanding Jurisdiction]; Sherman Act "Jurisdiction," supra note 149, at 125-30.
15" E.g., Mortensen v. First Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)
(footnote omitted):
Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court's jurisdiction-its
very power to hear the case-there is substantial authority that the trial court is
free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear
the case. In short, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations,
and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from
evaluating for itself the merits ofjurisdictional issues. Moreover, the plaintiff will
have the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.
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merits-related grounds was thought to be difficult. ' This is no longer
true; motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment are regu-
larly granted in antitrust cases. "" There is thus no justification for treat-
ing interstate commerce issues as ordinarily jurisdictional.
The consequences of adopting Justice Scalia's Summit Health position
would be especially far-reaching were the commerce question considered
jurisdictional. Such an approach would require antitrust plaintiffs to
demonstrate anticompetitive effects before courts had power to decide
their cases. This would transplant the heart of antitrust law into the
jurisdictional issue. Such a change could significantly shift power from
juries to judges.'"' This would tend to enhance certainty or at least
predictability once the law was settled, but it is not what Congress in-
tended.
In addition to being read as considering interstate commerce issues
ordinarily ones of substantive law, Summit Health should be read as contin-
uing to require some nexus between challenged conduct and interstate
commerce. Such a requirement is not onerous; to the contrary, it is easily
satisfied. 162 There is no need to show that the flow of interstate commerce
has been diminished; 63 all that is required is to show that a restraint has
151 See generally 5 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.36[2.-2] (1988) ("As a matter of policy,
there is much to be said for approaching problems of statutory coverage as triable to
the court when reasonably separable from the facts of violation."). For arguments that
jurisdictional treatment is justified as a necessary tool lor disposing of weak antitrust cases,
see ExpandingJurisdiction, supra note 157, at 167-73.
"See e.g., Calkins, supra note 145.
"" In Omni, as in Business Electronics, Justice Stevens complained that Justice Scalia lacked
confidence injuries. Supra text at notes 56-57. Whether or not he distrUstsJuriCs, Justice
Scalia clearly is unhappy about what he perceives as excessive antitrust litigation in the
federal courts:
Disputes over the denial of hospital practice privileges are common, and most
of the circuits to which they have been presented as federal antitrust clainms have
rejected them onjurisdictional grounds .... Federal courts are an attractive forum,
and the treble damages remedy of the Clayton Act an attractive remedy. We have
today made them available for routine business torts, needlessly destroying a
sensible statutory allocation of federal-state responsibility and contributing to the
trivialization of the federal courts.
Summit Health, Ill S. Ct. at 1854 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
162 For instance, the leading case reading McLain narrowly is the Tenth Cit'cuit's opinion
in Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1981) (en banc), yet
the Tenth Circuit has repeatedly found interstate commerce requirements satisfied, see
Anesthesia Advantage, Inc. v. Metz Group, 912 F.2d 397 (10th Cir. 1990); Lease Lights,
Inc. v. Public Serv. Co., 701 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 1983); Mishler v. St. Anthony's Hosp. Sys.,
694 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1981); see also Nelson v. Monroe Regional Medical Center, 925
F.2d 1555 (7th Cir. 1991) (another relatively strict circuit found commerce ieqttitement
satisfied in suit by patient challenging acquired medical clinic's refusal of treatment).
a ' Anesthesia Advantage, Inc. v. Metz Group, 912 F.2d 397,401 (10th Cir. 1990); Cardio-
Medical Assocs. v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 721 F.2d 69, 74 (3d Cir. 1983).
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affected or reasonably can be expected to affect interstate commerce in
a not insubstantial way.'"' In conspiracy cases, this means examining the
likely effect on commerce if the conspiracy were to succeed."5 One is
reminded of Chicago Board of Trade's observation that "[e]very agreement
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains."'" The principal
Sherman Act inquiry asks whether the restraint is unreasonable. The
interstate commerce inquiry is different. It focuses merely on a chal-
lenged restraint's actual or potential connection with interstate trade.
Justice Scalia apparently prefers a more searching scrutiny of competi-
tive effects as part of the commerce requirement inquiry, and perhaps
in deciding whether a court has jurisdiction. His view might have pre-
vailed had Justice Thomas already replaced Justice Marshall, who pro-
vided an essential fifth vote for the majority. Summit Health saw the five
seniorJustices outvote the fourJustices nominated by Presidents Reagan
and Bush. Now the Reagan-Bush appointees have a majority.
Justice Thomas's limited record as a jurist, moreover, evidences an
interest in closely scrutinizing assertions of judicial authority. A good
example is Cross-Sound Ferry Services, Inc. v. ICC.'"7 The District of Colum-
bia Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Mikva (joined by Judge Williams),
upheld an ICC action on the merits without deciding whether the plain-
tiff had standing, since the merits were obvious but the standing issue
'" Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp endorsed Judge Breyer's formulation in Cordova
& Simonpietri Ins. Agency Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 649 F.2d 37, 45 (1st Cir.
1981) (it must be "logical, as a matter of practical economics, to believe that the unlawful
activity will affect interstate commerce"), quoted in P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note
43, at 255.
165 Attention to the potential effect of a successful conspiracy is necessary because agree-
ments may violate the Sherman Act even before implemented. This was a key consideration
in McLain. 444 U.S. at 243 ("Ifestablishingjurisdiction required a showing that the unlawful
conduct itself had an effect on interstate commerce, jurisdiction would be defeated by a
demonstration that the alleged restraint failed to have its intended anticompetitive effect."),
quoted in Summit Health, Ill S. Ct. at 1847. Rex Hospital focused similarly on the effects
that would have been caused by a successful conspiracy. 425 U.S. at 746 (sufficient that
-allegations fairly claim that the alleged conspiracy, to the extent it is successful," will
burden commerce).
Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918):
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple
a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade,
every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress
or even destroy competition.
" 934 F.2d 327 (D. C. Cir. 1991). For another example, see Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d
1370, 1383 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Thomas, J., dissenting). The court of appeals addressed a
serviceman's challenge to an inoculation required by "Desert Storm" regulations. Judge
Thomas dissented on grounds of mootness. "The war has ended and the troops are home,
but to the majority this case lives on."
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was difficult and far-reaching. Then-Judge Thomas agreed that the ICC
finding should be upheld but objected strenuously to the court's ad-
dressing the merits:
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. When federal jurisdic-
tion does not exist, federal judges have no authority to exercise it, even
if everyone-judges, parties, members of the public-wants the dispute
resolved. It follows that federal courts have a "special obligation" to
appraise at the outset their own jurisdiction, even when the parties, or
the lower courts, have not raised anyjurisdictional questions themselves.
This tenet is as solid as bedrock and almost as old.
The truistic constraint on the federal judicial power, then, is this: A
federal court may not decide cases when it cannot decide cases, and
must determine whether it can, before it may.'"
Justice Thomas's instincts on issues of judicial authority thus seem to be
closer to Justice Scalia's than to Justice Stevens's.
Of course, Summit Health is now the law of the land, and principles of
stare decisis should apply. Since the Court's opinion can be read a number
of different ways, however, confusion may continue and the Court likely
will have opportunities to revisit the issue. Some are starting to question
the strength of stare decisis in other contexts;" query how strong it is
here.
IV. CONCLUSION
Two of the antitrust cases decided by the Supreme Court during its
October 1990 term are easily characterized. Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc.
is an additional corrective, if one were needed after Superior Court Trial
Lawyers, of any excessive hesitancy to apply settled per se rules. City of
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. is a ringing assertion of the
primacy of federalism. The strengthening of the state action and Noerr-
, 934 F.2d at 339-40 (ThomasJ., concurring) (citations and quotations omitted). Judge
Thomas would have ruled that a ferry injured by an ICC decision could not challenge that
decision on environmental grounds because the ICC may not regulate for environmental
reasons and, in addition, competitors lack "prudential standing" because they "are not
within the zone of interests" protected by environmental laws. Id. at 336-39 & n.5.
1' In Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2613-14 (1991), for instance, Justice Scalia,
joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, argued as follows:
That doctrine (stare decisis], to the extent it rests upon anything more than
administrative convenience, is merely the application to judicial precedents of a
more general principle that the settled practices and expectations of a democratic
society should generally not be disturbed by the courts. It is hard to have a genuine
regard for stare decisis without honoring that more general principle as well.
Since Justice Scalia regards McLain as having disturbed settled expectations, one can easily
imagine his arguing against an interpretation of Summit Health that would prevent reestab-
lishing what he views as pre-McLain principles.
1992]
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL
Pennington exemptions already has made it easier forjudges to terminate
antitrust suits.
The Palmer and Omni decisions have increased certainty in antitrust
law. Certainty or at least predictability would have been increased further
had Justice Scalia's position in Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas attracted an
additional vote, because he apparently would have had judges consider
competitive effects as part of determining their authority to hear cases.
Such a charge could shift power from juries to judges, who are often
considered more consistent decision-makers.
As it is, however, the Sherman Act's interstate commerce requirement
will be governed by Justice Stevens's majority opinion. That opinion
should be read to find that the commerce requirement is ordinarily
substantive, rather than jurisdictional, and that it requires some connec-
tion between the challenged restraint and interstate commerce. The
opinion is subject to conflicting interpretations, however, and the strenu-
ousness of justice Scalia's dissent-which would have increased predict-
ability had it attracted a majority-will contribute to the likely unsettled
state of this part of the law.
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